login   |    register
History Club
Military history and past events only. Rants or inflamitory comments will be removed.
Hosted by Frank Amato
Blunders?
LuckyBlunder
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Kansas, United States
Joined: February 02, 2006
KitMaker: 273 posts
AeroScale: 163 posts
Posted: Saturday, November 27, 2010 - 07:16 PM UTC
Just finished Beevor's "Stalingrad" (excellent, by the way) in which he discusses some of the blunders made by HItler in the lead up chapters. Most good books do have similiar discussions and it's well known that Hitler forced the German Army into several blunders.

This leads me to ask, what, in everyones opinion, were the greatest allied blunders?

IMHO the greatest allied blunder was in its failure to respond to the initial German moves, i.e. the remilitarization of the Rhineland - appeasement.



ppawlak1
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Victoria, Australia
Joined: March 14, 2006
KitMaker: 1,973 posts
AeroScale: 59 posts
Posted: Saturday, November 27, 2010 - 07:32 PM UTC
The failure of the French to create a Second Front in the Second week of September 1939.

Dangeroo
#023
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zurich, Switzerland
Joined: March 13, 2009
KitMaker: 2,058 posts
AeroScale: 67 posts
Posted: Saturday, November 27, 2010 - 09:25 PM UTC

Quoted Text

The failure of the French to create a Second Front in the Second week of September 1939.




I agree. But then you're always smarter afterwards... Who would have known at the time that the west front was so weakly defended?
ppawlak1
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Victoria, Australia
Joined: March 14, 2006
KitMaker: 1,973 posts
AeroScale: 59 posts
Posted: Saturday, November 27, 2010 - 09:53 PM UTC

Quoted Text


Quoted Text

The failure of the French to create a Second Front in the Second week of September 1939.




I agree. But then you're always smarter afterwards... Who would have known at the time that the west front was so weakly defended?



The French ......
muchachos
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Ontario, Canada
Joined: May 21, 2008
KitMaker: 537 posts
AeroScale: 4 posts
Posted: Sunday, November 28, 2010 - 07:55 AM UTC
Being Canadian, it's my patriotic duty to say, "Dieppe." Which is true, in some ways.
Torchy
#047
_VISITCOMMUNITY
England - East Anglia, United Kingdom
Joined: September 13, 2005
KitMaker: 2,016 posts
AeroScale: 475 posts
Posted: Monday, November 29, 2010 - 04:16 AM UTC
Ignoring the Dutch underground info about the German strength at Arnhem,shocking!
russamotto
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Utah, United States
Joined: December 14, 2007
KitMaker: 3,389 posts
AeroScale: 375 posts
Posted: Monday, November 29, 2010 - 11:36 AM UTC
And ignoring the front line reports of the German build up before the Bulge. And choosing to go with direct frontal attack to close it instead of cutting it off from the flanks.
chicane
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Dublin, Ireland
Joined: March 25, 2008
KitMaker: 201 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Monday, November 29, 2010 - 01:53 PM UTC
i would say the italy campaign especially anzio and general mark clark taking rome which was an open city instead of cutting off retreating german 10th army and letting them escape and set up another defencive line in northern italy
GSPatton
_VISITCOMMUNITY
California, United States
Joined: September 04, 2002
KitMaker: 1,410 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Tuesday, November 30, 2010 - 08:09 PM UTC
The US which mis-handles the intelligence on Japan which indicated an attack was eminent.
jimb
_VISITCOMMUNITY
New York, United States
Joined: August 25, 2006
KitMaker: 2,539 posts
AeroScale: 231 posts
Posted: Wednesday, December 01, 2010 - 12:54 PM UTC
Allowing the German & Italian armies to escape Sicily, and dig in in Italy.

Operation Market Garden (I guess they had to try, though).

Jim
LuckyBlunder
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Kansas, United States
Joined: February 02, 2006
KitMaker: 273 posts
AeroScale: 163 posts
Posted: Thursday, December 02, 2010 - 02:08 PM UTC

Quoted Text

Being Canadian, it's my patriotic duty to say, "Dieppe." Which is true, in some ways.



Are we certain that Dieppe was a true blunder? I grant that it it was a sacrifice of some fine troops that could have been put to good use in Normandy, but it's hard for me to believe that the Allied HQ's just woke up one morning and said "Let's send the Canadiens into Dieppe and see what happens"

Could it have been intended to keep German Divisions in the west?
Dangeroo
#023
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zurich, Switzerland
Joined: March 13, 2009
KitMaker: 2,058 posts
AeroScale: 67 posts
Posted: Thursday, December 02, 2010 - 07:46 PM UTC
To my knwoledge Dieppe was a (very) large scale commando raid which failed to achieve its goals. But it provided valuable information for Overlord. On the other hand I wonder what the effect on German defenses in France was.

On a similar note, in "World War II" (a US magazine) it was stated, that the raid on Makin was in a way a blunder as it woke the Japanese and made them fortify many islands in the pacific (such as Tarawa) which until then were not very well fortified.

Cheers!
Stefan
trickymissfit
Joined: October 03, 2007
KitMaker: 1,388 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Friday, December 03, 2010 - 05:34 AM UTC
several blunders jump out right in my face

* the Japanese failure to know out the P.O.L., drydocks, and crane system at Pearl Harbor may have been far more important than sinking any ship

* In an interview with several German Generals one thing they were all in line with was the removal of troops right before the attack on Stalingrad, as well as just setting there for two weeks. They felt that in full strength they would have taken Stalingrad in two to three weeks, but instead gave the Russians two extra weeks to prepare

* a plan was seriously considered that involved a push southward thru Turkey, Palestine, and on into Iraq and Iran. With the Suez under their control the north of Africa would have been untenable, and put the oil fields out of bomber range. Like the above Hitler killed it.

* the grand idea that the radar systems on U.S. capital ships would give them all the advantages they needed in ship to ship fighting (especially after dark or in close order fighting). Japanese ship board gunnery quality was well known, and the U.S. felt they had the upper hand. The first two major engagments proved differently, but yet nobody was a clear winner.
gary
DutchBird
#068
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
Joined: April 09, 2003
KitMaker: 1,144 posts
AeroScale: 123 posts
Posted: Tuesday, December 07, 2010 - 12:10 AM UTC

Quoted Text


Quoted Text


Quoted Text

The failure of the French to create a Second Front in the Second week of September 1939.




I agree. But then you're always smarter afterwards... Who would have known at the time that the west front was so weakly defended?



The French ......



Apparently this is a widely held misconception - the problem was not (in itself) the absence of defences or numbers or quality weaponry or, to some extent, even an adequate plan.

The problem as I see it was twofold:

1. The misconception that the Ardennes could not be crossed by tanks.
2. The complete breakdown of command once the Germans crossed the Meuse.


And for the record, the French were not ready for war at all in 1939 - non of the Western Allies were.

DutchBird
#068
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
Joined: April 09, 2003
KitMaker: 1,144 posts
AeroScale: 123 posts
Posted: Tuesday, December 07, 2010 - 12:24 AM UTC
One blunders that comes to mind:

1. The tendency among the Americans to completely ignore warnings/advise/experience from their fellow Allies who had much more experience fighting the Germans. This cost many American soldiers on the ground their lives. Examples of this

- Kasserine pass.
- D-Day (refusing the British offer of specialized engineering vehicles (the so-called funnies) which were a great help on the non-American beaches.
- Just 'forgetting' about non-American naval ships that could support American troops moving inland after D-Day.
- Ignoring the Free French troops (mostly North Africans) which were assigned to the American sector, when stuck before Anzio. Ironically they were the ones who finally broke deadlock by disobeying the orders of Clark. And this after repeated American failures to do the same (and this latter is not meant as an insult to the troops themselves who tried, died and failed to do the same).

Other blunders:

For the Germans: Invading Russia in the first place.

Repeatedly (on many sides):

Complete breakdowns in communication to notify of withdrawals of troops or absence of commanders and clarify the new chain of command (Guadalcanal is an extreme example, but of course the Germans on the eve of D-Day is another).
LuckyBlunder
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Kansas, United States
Joined: February 02, 2006
KitMaker: 273 posts
AeroScale: 163 posts
Posted: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 - 04:41 PM UTC
"Complete breakdowns in communication to notify of withdrawals of troops or absence of commanders and clarify the new chain of command (Guadalcanal is an extreme example, but of course the Germans on the eve of D-Day is another)."

Well said. Another example along the same lines is the failure to provide Admiral Kimmel and General Short with proper intel prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The general understanding I've gained about this is that there was enough information provided to confuse the situation but no clear picture of the diplomatic situation.
trickymissfit
Joined: October 03, 2007
KitMaker: 1,388 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Friday, December 10, 2010 - 10:36 AM UTC

Quoted Text

One blunders that comes to mind:

1. The tendency among the Americans to completely ignore warnings/advise/experience from their fellow Allies who had much more experience fighting the Germans. This cost many American soldiers on the ground their lives. Examples of this

- Kasserine pass.
- D-Day (refusing the British offer of specialized engineering vehicles (the so-called funnies) which were a great help on the non-American beaches.
- Just 'forgetting' about non-American naval ships that could support American troops moving inland after D-Day.
- Ignoring the Free French troops (mostly North Africans) which were assigned to the American sector, when stuck before Anzio. Ironically they were the ones who finally broke deadlock by disobeying the orders of Clark. And this after repeated American failures to do the same (and this latter is not meant as an insult to the troops themselves who tried, died and failed to do the same).

Other blunders:

For the Germans: Invading Russia in the first place.

Repeatedly (on many sides):

Complete breakdowns in communication to notify of withdrawals of troops or absence of commanders and clarify the new chain of command (Guadalcanal is an extreme example, but of course the Germans on the eve of D-Day is another).



must dissagree with you!
* in after war interviews with the German Generals they one thing they had to say about Russian and U.S. strikes against them was pure speed. They often were overrun brfore they really got moving. Where as fighting against Montgomery was different. Things tended to stay in place for a hard long fought battle. Add to this the well known idea that sometime around 3 or 4 in the afternoon the the boys were stopping for tea

* honestly I can't say much one way or another about the Kasserine Pass campaigns. Need to take a long serious look at them.

* Perhaps the other beach heads, but the American troops were nearly out of gun range, and if you really dig deep you will find a lot trouble with the Naval gunnery. They accomplished very little in their bombardment, and the aircraft did all the serious damage ( "China" Lee, and Bull Halsey both said their battalships couldn't hit anything)

* I'm about three chapters into Albert Kesselring's book. Add to this the comentary put out by the U.S. Army War College concerning events in Italy, and the Balkans; one might have another opinion (the reader is given the opinion that they had little use for Clark, and pretty much the entire Allied General Staff)

****************************************
** The Germans thru their own spy network knew that Stalin was upto something, but to the extent they didn't know. The real blunder was the failure to take Malta, Gibralter, and the Suez Canal. By taking the major islands, they would have controlled all of N. Africa and the oil fields.

** Guadalcanal really was a learning experience along with stopping the Japanese from getting things setup for an invasion of Australia. It had to happen even though the Allies were not completely prepaired. Taking this in to fact, plus hints of what a close order naval engagement might be like; it turned into a meat grinder. Had the Japanese successfully landed troops on Guadalcanal, it would have only prolonged the eventual victory there. What they never anticipated was the quality of the Japanese Naval Staff, and their ability to conduct a major naval engagement without radar and at night. The Allies in the PTO were hardly ready for a major engagment, and really were not till very late 1942 or early 1943

For myself, I think the two greatest blunders were at Peleu (sp) and Okwinawa (PTO). The first was probably as bad as it got for no bigger a place than it was. The latter was taken too lightly, and ended up being a bloodbath. The entire island was used as an artillary training school, and they had every inch of the island pre-registered for artillary. The Marines and Army paid dearly for this lack of known knowledge (the Marine General Staff knew this and failed to pass it down to the ground troops).

******************************************
another interesting item that's mostly overlooked was that the original FW190 design was with the inline V12 engine instead of the radial. Similar in ways to the FW190D9 series. Had this been put in production the Allies might never have had much success with their bombing raids. Then to add further to this the TA152 first flew in 1943, but never went into production till late in the war. It's almost always regarded as the finest fighter of WWII. German politics saved the bacon!
gary
DutchBird
#068
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
Joined: April 09, 2003
KitMaker: 1,144 posts
AeroScale: 123 posts
Posted: Thursday, December 16, 2010 - 11:27 AM UTC

Quoted Text




I must dissagree with you!
* in after war interviews with the German Generals they one thing they had to say about Russian and U.S. strikes against them was pure speed. They often were overrun brfore they really got moving. Where as fighting against Montgomery was different. Things tended to stay in place for a hard long fought battle. Add to this the well known idea that sometime around 3 or 4 in the afternoon the the boys were stopping for tea




One thing to keep in mind is that many German generals in post-war interviews were not completely truthful for various reasons - vendettas against fellow generals, blame-shifting, or flattering the victorious commanders. And this would include a (far) too favourable assessment of the performance of the allied troops and commanders. A well-known example of this is Bayerlein (commander of Panzer Lehr).

I also think you are missing the point in my assessment of Kasserine. For some reason 'the Americans' refused to listen to advise from those who had already been fighting the Germans for three years. The British had learned some extremely harsh lessons about German tactics and doctrine, and had learned to counter them - part of the reason why El Alamein was fought on British terms and the much critisized 'caution' of Montgomery. By 1943 (or actually to some extent summer 1942) the Russians had learned the same lesson.

So rather than profitting from the lessons the other allies had already learned, the Americans had to learn them all over again (in the initial phases of the Battle the Americans fell into the same trap that the British had fallen into in previous years, and were now adept at recognizing and avoiding), at the cost of many casualties... Note also that something similar happened in Iraq and Afghanistan...


Quoted Text


* Perhaps the other beach heads, but the American troops were nearly out of gun range, and if you really dig deep you will find a lot trouble with the Naval gunnery. They accomplished very little in their bombardment, and the aircraft did all the serious damage ( "China" Lee, and Bull Halsey both said their battalships couldn't hit anything)



Of course naval gunnery had trouble with accuracy... but that is no excuse for not using any ships available, expecially ships that seem to have proven very effective in fire support in the Mediterranean, aiding the allied troops on Sicily and in Italy.



Quoted Text


* I'm about three chapters into Albert Kesselring's book. Add to this the comentary put out by the U.S. Army War College concerning events in Italy, and the Balkans; one might have another opinion (the reader is given the opinion that they had little use for Clark, and pretty much the entire Allied General Staff)



True, there were many problems with the Allied General Staff in Italy as a whole. And all of the allied commanders seem to have been guilty of unwillingness to use non-white or non-national (like Free French, or Polish) troops, although perhaps the British commanders slightly less so because of their forced experience early in the war (having to use Indian troops and the Maori troops serving in the New Zealand units). Racism undoubtedly played an unfortunate part in these decisions.
In front of Anzio the most extreme of this seems to have been Clark vis--vis the Free French, even though, it seems, many of the American troops on the ground were well aware of their own limitations, and disagreed with him.

[/quote]
** The Germans thru their own spy network knew that Stalin was upto something, but to the extent they didn't know. The real blunder was the failure to take Malta, Gibralter, and the Suez Canal. By taking the major islands, they would have controlled all of N. Africa and the oil fields.
[quote]

To what extent Stalin was up to something is unknown and uncertain, AFAIK... Indeed, not securing Malta and/or Gibraltar was a major mistake. However, the oil field would still have been out of reach (North African oil fields were still underdeveloped). The real prize, as far as oil goes, was the Caucasus.


Quoted Text


** Guadalcanal really was a learning experience along with stopping the Japanese from getting things setup for an invasion of Australia. It had to happen even though the Allies were not completely prepaired. Taking this in to fact, plus hints of what a close order naval engagement might be like; it turned into a meat grinder. Had the Japanese successfully landed troops on Guadalcanal, it would have only prolonged the eventual victory there. What they never anticipated was the quality of the Japanese Naval Staff, and their ability to conduct a major naval engagement without radar and at night. The Allies in the PTO were hardly ready for a major engagment, and really were not till very late 1942 or early 1943



I am not saying that Guadalcanal was not necessary or that a costly learning experience was unavoidable. Again I think you miss the point (although I probably should have made that clearer). The mess around Savo Island was at least in part caused by a major breakdown in communications on almost all levels (from Supreme Command down to the individual ships), which had nothing to do with having to learn lessons, but everything with not following proper procedures if not outright laziness. And perhaps, again, a gross underestimation of the capabilities of the Japanese Imperial Navy for which there was little excuse - since they had been demonstrated on many occasions before and during the war at that point.


Quoted Text


For myself, I think the two greatest blunders were at Peleu (sp) and Okwinawa (PTO). The first was probably as bad as it got for no bigger a place than it was. The latter was taken too lightly, and ended up being a bloodbath. The entire island was used as an artillary training school, and they had every inch of the island pre-registered for artillary. The Marines and Army paid dearly for this lack of known knowledge (the Marine General Staff knew this and failed to pass it down to the ground troops).



Sounds indeed like a bad one, on a operational/tactical level.


Quoted Text


another interesting item that's mostly overlooked was that the original FW190 design was with the inline V12 engine instead of the radial. Similar in ways to the FW190D9 series. Had this been put in production the Allies might never have had much success with their bombing raids. Then to add further to this the TA152 first flew in 1943, but never went into production till late in the war. It's almost always regarded as the finest fighter of WWII. German politics saved the bacon!



I do not necessarily think this was a serious blunder, for various reasons - the success of the Allied bomber raids seems to have been overestimated. Although better technical designs might have had some effect, there was no way the Germans would have won the war as long as the allies were willing to fight - the industrial and population base would have made sure of it. The Allies would have won in the end, although probably at a higher cost.
casailor
Joined: June 22, 2007
KitMaker: 165 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Monday, February 07, 2011 - 10:23 AM UTC
Gudalcanal was a bloody mess, but a necessary learning field. It was where our pre-war doctrine was tested and modifed to be effective against the Japanese.

My vote for a blunder was that the US didn't use the specalized armord vehicles developed for the Pacific at Normandy. Picture Army troops in LVT(A)s driving right up onto the beach supported by AMTANKS instead of that bloody slog through the killing zone at Omaha.
trickymissfit
Joined: October 03, 2007
KitMaker: 1,388 posts
AeroScale: 0 posts
Posted: Tuesday, February 08, 2011 - 04:50 AM UTC

Quoted Text

Gudalcanal was a bloody mess, but a necessary learning field. It was where our pre-war doctrine was tested and modifed to be effective against the Japanese.

My vote for a blunder was that the US didn't use the specalized armord vehicles developed for the Pacific at Normandy. Picture Army troops in LVT(A)s driving right up onto the beach supported by AMTANKS instead of that bloody slog through the killing zone at Omaha.



Post is an interesting thought. The German heavy artillary was suspect all thru the war, and their best stuff was 128mm and smaller. Not at all sure the 105 would have the range needed to knock out an Amtrac, but if it did; it would have been hell for them. As well as taking into fact that the sea swells were much heavier on the northern French coast line. In the end one has to credit Rommel for a beautifully prepaired defensive position that was really only about 70% of what he wanted to build. Had he had his way (100%), things would have been much tougher, but in the end the results would still have been the same. The Allied air armada is what made the invasion a success along with Hitler helping them.

Another interesting thought here is another "what if." What if Albert Kessellring had been the chosen one to setup the defensive network for the French coastline? Kessellring was clearly a better qualified general, and was on good terms with Heinrici (a well known defensive genius). With these two acting together, an established beach head would have been even harder.
gary
DutchBird
#068
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
Joined: April 09, 2003
KitMaker: 1,144 posts
AeroScale: 123 posts
Posted: Tuesday, February 08, 2011 - 06:09 AM UTC

Quoted Text


Quoted Text

Gudalcanal was a bloody mess, but a necessary learning field. It was where our pre-war doctrine was tested and modifed to be effective against the Japanese.

My vote for a blunder was that the US didn't use the specalized armord vehicles developed for the Pacific at Normandy. Picture Army troops in LVT(A)s driving right up onto the beach supported by AMTANKS instead of that bloody slog through the killing zone at Omaha.



Post is an interesting thought. The German heavy artillary was suspect all thru the war, and their best stuff was 128mm and smaller. Not at all sure the 105 would have the range needed to knock out an Amtrac, but if it did; it would have been hell for them. As well as taking into fact that the sea swells were much heavier on the northern French coast line. In the end one has to credit Rommel for a beautifully prepaired defensive position that was really only about 70% of what he wanted to build. Had he had his way (100%), things would have been much tougher, but in the end the results would still have been the same. The Allied air armada is what made the invasion a success along with Hitler helping them.



Apart from the potential problems with the sea swells, would the Allies even have had any/sufficient Amtrac's available to them? AFAIK they already were at a critical minimum for 'normal' landing craft - that is to say, the limited number of landing craft prevented the allies from putting as many men on the beaches in the initial waves as they had wanted... similar to the problems they later faced with transport aircraft available to fly in the airborne troops during Market Garden - apart from the stupid choices they made in the allocation of the available aircraft.



Quoted Text


Another interesting thought here is another "what if." What if Albert Kessellring had been the chosen one to setup the defensive network for the French coastline? Kessellring was clearly a better qualified general, and was on good terms with Heinrici (a well known defensive genius). With these two acting together, an established beach head would have been even harder.
gary



I have come across a few less flattering opinions about Kesselring. Also, do not forget that Kesselring was aided greatly in his efforts by both the terrain, the fact that the Allies quickly shifted focus elsewhere - so he never faced the brunt (in quality and quantity) of the western allied forces -, might have had a relatively experienced and high quality army under his command, and generally faced second rate allied commanding officers (again, first rate being sent to France).
mmeier
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany
Joined: October 22, 2008
KitMaker: 1,280 posts
AeroScale: 3 posts
Posted: Tuesday, February 08, 2011 - 09:58 AM UTC
German blunders:

Striking from the Forehand (Kursk-Orel) in 1943 instead of from the Backend. Had the germans shortened their frontline and gone defensive they would have gotten the chance to fine tune the new tanks and equipment (and train the crews) and be in a better positon (for defence or offence) in 1944.

Giving an amateur (Rommel) a job that would have required a professional (Securing the channel coast)

Allowing politics and egos to intervene with military production (Messerschmidt, von Braun, Porsche)

Producing/constructing the A4 instead of SAMs

Keeping outdated equipment (Panzer III, ME109 after FW190D and ME262 where out etc) and no longer needed backup solutions (Tiger) in production
=================

As for the 12 cylinder inline engine (DB60x) in the prototype FW190: Production of the engine was to low, It was a must have for the ME109 (then the current fighter) and Destroyer (ME110) So a FW190 with DB was a non-starter, it was either the BMW801 or no fighter at all
goldenpony
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zimbabwe
Joined: July 03, 2007
KitMaker: 3,529 posts
AeroScale: 54 posts
Posted: Thursday, February 10, 2011 - 02:07 AM UTC
Another one was not supplying the Africa Corps. Rommel could have taken Egypt had he been supplied.

Also not pushing forward the the ME-262 when it was first brought forward.

Japan not pushing the advantage and invading Hawaii, or attacking again.

Not giving Patton the gas instead of Monty.

The list goes on and on.

Armchair Gemeral is an easy rank to have considering we all know where the mistakes were made. I am a big what if person.

DutchBird
#068
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
Joined: April 09, 2003
KitMaker: 1,144 posts
AeroScale: 123 posts
Posted: Thursday, February 10, 2011 - 07:54 AM UTC

Quoted Text

Another one was not supplying the Africa Corps. Rommel could have taken Egypt had he been supplied.

Also not pushing forward the the ME-262 when it was first brought forward.

Japan not pushing the advantage and invading Hawaii, or attacking again.

Not giving Patton the gas instead of Monty.

The list goes on and on.

Armchair Gemeral is an easy rank to have considering we all know where the mistakes were made. I am a big what if person.




There are a few interesting ones here...

- Not supplying Rommel: Blame has been put on the Italians here (by and large), but the biggest problem, it seems, was not getting rid of the Royal Navy presence in the Mediterranean, and the first step in that respect should have been invading Malta. And Arguably a second step eliminating Gibraltar.

- Japan not attacking Hawaii again: This one is obvious, especially if they had been able to hunt down the US carriers that had escaped.

-Not giving Patton the gass: Highly doubtful, since it is already a massive what-if based on somebody who was one of the best self-advertisers among the Allies, and whose greatest success came against forces that already had been bled white (admittedly he did exploit this very well)... Patton's style could even have led to a new Market Garden, with the American armoured forces being trapped rather than the airborne units. Mind you that one of the pillars of German defensice doctrine was based on cutting off the armoured spearheads leading enemy attacks, and destroying them in a Kesselschlacht. And they had proven very good at it.
Not to mention the political fallout and the logistical problem, since another further advance would make extending the allied supply base on the continent all but impossible,


And indeed, armchair generalling is a lot of fun.
goldenpony
_VISITCOMMUNITY
Zimbabwe
Joined: July 03, 2007
KitMaker: 3,529 posts
AeroScale: 54 posts
Posted: Thursday, February 10, 2011 - 12:17 PM UTC

Quoted Text


Quoted Text

Another one was not supplying the Africa Corps. Rommel could have taken Egypt had he been supplied.

Also not pushing forward the the ME-262 when it was first brought forward.

Japan not pushing the advantage and invading Hawaii, or attacking again.

Not giving Patton the gas instead of Monty.

The list goes on and on.

Armchair Gemeral is an easy rank to have considering we all know where the mistakes were made. I am a big what if person.




There are a few interesting ones here...

- Not supplying Rommel: Blame has been put on the Italians here (by and large), but the biggest problem, it seems, was not getting rid of the Royal Navy presence in the Mediterranean, and the first step in that respect should have been invading Malta. And Arguably a second step eliminating Gibraltar.

- Japan not attacking Hawaii again: This one is obvious, especially if they had been able to hunt down the US carriers that had escaped.

-Not giving Patton the gass: Highly doubtful, since it is already a massive what-if based on somebody who was one of the best self-advertisers among the Allies, and whose greatest success came against forces that already had been bled white (admittedly he did exploit this very well)... Patton's style could even have led to a new Market Garden, with the American armoured forces being trapped rather than the airborne units. Mind you that one of the pillars of German defensice doctrine was based on cutting off the armoured spearheads leading enemy attacks, and destroying them in a Kesselschlacht. And they had proven very good at it.
Not to mention the political fallout and the logistical problem, since another further advance would make extending the allied supply base on the continent all but impossible,


And indeed, armchair generalling is a lot of fun.



Very good counter point on Patton, hadn't thought about it that way before.

Another blunder that is crazy. Stopping the attacks against the RAF and switching to cities.

Also something that people forget about is this. Germany did not shift its economy to a war time footing until after the war had started. If I recall they did not start a true war economy until late 40 or early 41.



C|:-)